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Abstract
Recent years have witnessed an enormous amount of reorganization of the
corporate sector in the US and in Europe. This paper examines the role of
market competition for this trend in corporate reorganization. We find that
at intermediate levels of competition the CEO of the corporation decides
to have less power inside the firm and to delegate control to lower levels of
the firms’ hierarchy. Thus, workers empowerment and the move to flatter
firm organizations emerge as an equilibrium when competition is not too
tough and not too weak. The model predicts merger waves or waves of out-
sourcing when countries become more integrated into the world economy as
the corporate sector reorganizes in response to an increase in international
competition.
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1. Introduction
In the last two decades the corporate sector in the US and more recently in
Europe has gone through an enormous amount of restructuring. More than half
of all Fortune 500 firms have either been targets of takeovers or been involved
in some other sort of corporate struggle that has led them to restructure their
operations. At the same time, firms reorganized their activity by eliminating layers
of middle management, by introducing more decentralized decision making inside
the corporation and by empowering workers at lower levels of the firm hierarchy.
These developments resulted in flatter hierarchies within corporations.1
What accounts for these changes in corporate organization? It is often argued
that hierarchies are inflexible and inefficient. One of the reasons why hierarchies
are bad is that decisions have to be approved by several people before they can
pass.2 Another reason is that hierarchies might leave too little room for initiative
to individual workers’ leading to inefficient production. The lack of initiative of
the firm’s work force might have a particular strong negative impact on the firm’s
performance when it moves into new activity with less experience. The trend to
workers empowerment is then a way to tackle these inefficiencies.
Instead of looking at the possible weaknesses in the internal control mecha-
nisms of firms, we focus in this paper on changes in the economic environment
that can explain why firms have shifted the mode of organization. Recent years
have witnessed a surge in deregulation, both on the national as well as on the in-
ternational level. The resulting increase in competitive pressure might have been
the driving force behind the search for modes of organization which are ”mean
and lean”.3 In this paper we develop a theory of organization in which the firm
adapts its organization to changes in market conditions.
1For a description of recent trends in corporate organization see Holmstrom and Kaplan
(2001). For the phenomenon of empowerment in organizations see Argyris (1998) and Mohrman,
Galbraith, and Alwair (1998), for empirical evidence on the trend to flatter corporate hierarchies
see Rajan and Wulf (2003).
2In their assessment of how different systems explore and innovate Sah and Stiglitz (1986)
argue that hierarchies are particularly bad in times of change. For an evaluation of the com-
parative advantage of hierarchies and markets, see Holmstrom (2000), from the transaction cost
perspective, see Williamson (1975), from the property rights perspective see Grossman and Hart
(1986), Hart and Moore (1990).
3Holmstrom and Kaplan (2001) argue that the drivers of the changes in corporate governance
in the 1980s and 1990s are economy wide trends in deregulation, globalization, and information
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In a recent paper Aghion and Tirole (1997) (henceforth AT) develop a theory
of organization which is based on Max Weber’s distinction between ”rational” and
”legal” authority. AT describe the allocation of formal authority within organiza-
tions and of the separation between ”formal authority” and ”real authority”. A
CEO of a corporation who has ”formal” authority over a decision can reverse her
subordinate’s decision but will refrain from doing so if the subordinate is much
better informed and if she can trust him. The subordinate then has ”real”, but
no ”formal”, authority. Delegating formal decision power to the subordinate -
decentralization of decision making within the firm - comes with the benefit of
increasing the subordinate’s initiative but at the cost of the CEO’s loss of control
over the decision.
In this paper we are combining the AT model of firm organization with a Dixit
and Stiglitz (henceforth DS) model of monopolistic competition to describe the
interaction between the firm’s mode of organization on the one hand and market
competition on the other hand in a general equilibrium framework. The paper’s
contribution is in the following. First, the AT model describes the power dynam-
ics within a single firm but neglects the market environment in which the firm
operates. Thus, the firm’s profits and the conflict of interest between the CEO
and her division manager remain exogenous in the AT model. In this paper we
endogenize the firms profits by the degree of market power firms hold in product
markets for differentiated goods. Second, the DS model describes competition
among firms with market power but neglects the dynamics inside the firm. We
are opening the black box of the firm as an organization by modelling the power
dynamics between different layers of management. The integration of the two
models will allow us to examine how market competition affects the firm’s orga-
nization on the one hand and how the firm’s mode of organization feeds back to
the market place on the other.
We develop a general equilibriummodel with a monopolistic competitive sector
with differentiated goods. Consumers have preferences over varieties. Production
of the varieties in the monopolistic competitive sector is as in AT. A principal
hires an agent to monitor projects and workers to produce. There are m potential
methods of production of which one maximizes profits and another one maximizes
a private benefit for the agent.The principal and the agent gather information
technology. See also Bolton and Scharfstein (1998) for a survey of theories of organizational
change based on weaknesses in the internal control mechanism of firms.
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which of the m ways to run the firm maximizes profits and the private benefit of
the agent, respectively. If both agents find out which are their preferred projects,
the decision rights reside in the agent with formal authority. If only one of
the agents learns which her preferred project is, the uninformed agent always
rubber-stamps this project. In this case, the informed party has real authority.
In choosing between keeping formal authority or delegating power to the agent,
the principal trades off the benefit from control against the manager’s loss of
initiative.
The first result of the paper states that the principal will find it optimal to
give the manager formal power only when profits of the firm take intermediate
values. When profits are low, the principal’s stakes are low and she invests little
in information acquisition. This in turn implies that the division manager is
more likely to have real authority ex-post, and so it becomes unnecessary to
give him formal authority ex-ante. On the other hand, when profits are high,
the principal’s investment in information acquisition will tend to be high, and the
agent’s initiative will be killed even when he is given formal power. In such a case,
the principal is indifferent between keeping formal power or giving it away, so there
is no gain in assigning formal authority to the division manager. Finally, there
may exist intermediate levels of profits for which the principal finds it optimal
to delegate formal power to the agent to induce him to invest in information
acquisition.
We then solve for the general equilibrium (imposing free entry and factor
market clearing). Firms enter the market until profits are driven down to cover
the fixed costs. Interestingly, we find that product market competition (captured
by the elasticity of substitution between different varieties) increases the stakes
of the firm thereby influencing the behavior of the principal and the agent inside
the firm. Firms require larger profits to enter the market when product market
competition is tough. Furthermore, we find that product market competition is an
important determinant of the equilibrium mode of organization. With an increase
in competition the equilibrium firm organization moves from centralization of
power (P-organization) to decentralization of power (A-organization) to a single
managed firm (Dixit-Stiglitz firm). With an increase in competition firms require
a larger level of profit to enter the market. Initially, with little competition,
the stakes of the firm are low and the principal monitors little and does not
kill the initiative of the agent. Hence, firms choose the P-organization. When
competition keeps increasing, however, the stakes of the firm and the monitoring
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of the principal rises potentially destroying the intiative of the agent. The firm
then delegates power to the agent to keep his initiative. When competition is very
tough the entry stakes of the firm are so high that the principal wants control and
the DS-firm emerges as the equilibrium organization.
Our model delivers further interesting results. First, in the general equilibrium
of the closed economy, there exist a range of competition levels for which there are
multiple equilibria, with all principals in the monopolistically competitive sector
either delegating or not delegating power. Second, when two identical countries
open up to trade this could induce convergence of corporate cultures. It remains,
however, open to which organizational equilibrium the world economy converges.
This paper describes how international competition affects corporate organi-
zation in similar countries (North-North trade). In Marin and Verdier (2003a,
2003b) we introduce the AT-firm in an Helpman-Krugman model of trade in
which countries differ in factor endowments. Surprisingly, we find that North-
South trade integration leads to a ’war for talent’ inducing firms to empower their
human capital workers. Hence, workers empowerment and the move to flatter
corporate hierarchies emerge as an equilibrium in the world economy when the
world economy is governed by both North-North trade as well as by North-South
trade.
There is a small literature which introduces endogenous organizations in gen-
eral equilibrium. In Mc Laren (2001) final goods producers and input suppliers
face the choice between remaining separate firms or to merge to vertically inte-
grated firms. The choice depends on the trade-off between the hold-up problem
that input suppliers face relative to the costs of running a larger organization.
The trade-off is driven by the thickness of the market for inputs. The more un-
integrated firms are around the more likely it is that these firms will be potential
buyers of inputs from independent suppliers increasing the attractiveness of unin-
tegrated input supply. Thus, there is a negative externality from vertical integra-
tion which makes arm’s length arrangements less feasible for others. International
trade affects the trade-off between the hold-up problem and the governance costs
of a larger organization by increasing the number of alternative buyers abroad
making arms’ lengt transactions more remunerative. Based on a search-theoretic
concept of market thickness Kranton (1996) formalizes the idea of ’reciprocal ex-
change’ as an alternative to market exchange in developing countries and shows
that search externalities can give rise to multiple equilibria and inefficiencies in the
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choice between the two modes of organizations. Grossman and Helpman (2002)
develop an equilibrium model of industrial organization which examines the like-
lihood of an equilibrium with outsourcing and vertical integration. They analyze
the interaction between the degree of competition in the product market and the
existence of an equilibrium with outsourcing. An equilibrium with outsourcing is
most likely to exist when the excess costs of vertically integrated firms are large
and the degree of product market competition is neither too large nor too small.4
The paper is organised in the following sections. In section 2 we examine the
allocation of power inside the firm from a partial equilibrium perspective. We
determine the firm’s optimal firm organization in response to exogenous changes
in the market environment. In section 3 we embed the theory of firm organization
in a general equilibrium model in which differentiated consumer goods can be pro-
duced by firms with three types of organizations: a P-organization in which the
CEO has formal decision control, an A-organization in which the CEO delegates
decision power to lower management, and a single managed firm organization
without an internal hierarchy. We characterize the equilibrium industrial struc-
ture and we show that mixed equilibria do not exist in which different types of
firm organizations coexist in the economy. In section 4 we examine how changes
in market competition affect the equilibrium mode of organization. We show that
with an increase in competition the equilibrium firm organization moves from
centralization of power to decentralization of power and finally to a single man-
aged firm. Furthermore, we show that at intermediate levels of competition the
economy will be characterized by an A-organizational equilibrium in which power
is delegated to lower levels of the firms’ hierarchy. Thus, workers empowerment
and the move to flatter firm hierarchies are phenomena which emerge when com-
petition is not too tough and not too weak.5 The firms’ organizational decisions
4Legros and Newman (2000) examine organizations in a competitive market. They focus
on the allocation of ownership in the presence of liquidity constraints. They find that the
organization of all firms depends on the liquidity position of the marginal firm.
5In Grossman and Helpman (2002) an equilibrium with outsourcing emerges, as in our case,
at an intermediate level of competition. The mechanism is quite different, though. In Grossman
and Helpman, the outsourcing equilibrium arises from a trade-off of the costs of running a
larger organization with the potential costs of buying an inflated input. In our model, the A-
equilibrium arises from trading-off the CEO’s control in the firm with the workers’ initiative. In
contrast, the literature examining competition and its effect on X-inefficiencies in firms based
on agency problems does not always get a non-monotone relationship between cost reduction
efforts and competition. However, this literature does not consider changes in firm organization
in response to increased competitive pressures, see Schmidt (1997), Raith (2003) and Vives
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feature a strategic complementarity which can lead to multiple organizational
equilibria. Two otherwise identical countries migth have different corporate cul-
tures which will tend to converge when countries become more integrated into the
world economy. Finally, in section 5 concludes.
2. Power Dynamics inside the Firm
We first start with a simple partial equilibrium model of the choice of firm orga-
nization. This building block will be useful later when we analyze the interaction
between the power dynamics inside the firm and the market structure in a general
equilibrium model of monopolistic competition.
Following Aghion and Tirole (1997), we consider a firm with the simplest
hierarchy consisting of a CEO (the principal P) hiring a division manager (the
agent A) to implement a production project. There are m potential and a priori
identical projects (or ways to produce a good). Payoffs are ex ante unknown to
both parties. Among them projects, there is one which yields the highest possible
benefit B for the principal and one which yields the highest possible benefit b for
the agent. Let αB be the principal’s expected benefit when the agent’s preferred
project is implemented with (0 ≤ α ≤ 1). Similarly, βb is the agent’s expected
benefit when the principal’s preferred project is implemented with (0 ≤ β ≤ 1). α
and β are congruence parameters between the principal and the agent capturing
the degree of trust between the principal and the agent. The lower α and β the
lower is the mutual trust between the principal and agent.
B and b are supposed to be known ex ante though the parties do not know
ex ante which project yields such payoff. We assume also that, among the m
projects, there are some with very high negative payoffs to both parties, implying
that choosing randomly a project without being informed is not profitable to both
agents who instead prefer to do nothing (project 0). This aspect, together with
the fact that each uninformed party prefers to rubber-stamp the other informed’s
party suggestion to do nothing, implies that private information about payoffs
(2003).
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gives decision control to the informed party. In this case, the informed party has
”real authority” rather than ”formal authority”.6
Parties may acquire information on the payoff structure in the following way.
By spending some resource cost
gP (E) = g
E2
2
the principal P learns the payoff structure of all projects with probability E and
remains uniformed with probability 1−E. Similarly, by exerting some effort
gA(e) = ke with e ∈ [0, e], k < b
the agent learns the payoff structure of all projects with probability e and remains
uninformed with probability 1− e.7
We assume that the principal is risk neutral and that the agent is infinitely risk
averse with respect to income. Therefore, the agent is not responsive to monetary
incentives and he agrees to receive a fixed wage w equal to his opportunity cost.
His incentives to gather information on projects will be directly related to the
private non pecuniary benefit b he gets from his ”best” project.8
Decisions are taken in the following sequence. The principal allocates formal
power to herself (P-organization) or to the agent (A-organization). Then the two
parties collect information about projects’ payoff simultaneously. The party who
does not have decision power suggests a project (or nothing) to the other party.
Finally, the party with power rubber stamps the other party’s suggestion or selects
6As emphasized by Aghion and Tirole 1997, the amount of information acquisition is at the
heart of the distinction between ”formal” and ”real” decision power within firms.
7We need the principal’s and the agent’s costs of effort to differ to derive Proposition 2 of
a trade-off between control and initiative at intermediate levels of profits, see the dicussion on
page 15 why this is the case. The insight of Proposition 2 remains, however, valid when the
effort cost functions of the principal and the agent are reversed with the principal having linear
costs of effort and the agent convex ones.
8What makes principals and agents inherently different is not adressed by our model. In
fact, besides attitudes towards risk and cost of effort principals and agents do not differ in our
model. This is not a model of entrepreneurship and occupational choice, but rather how power
relations in organizations interact with market competition. We do not adress why and what
are the incentives for these organizations to exist in the first place. See the discussion on pages
24 and 25 how the model makes sure that there is an equal number of principals and agents.
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an alternative project, or decides to do nothing. Hence, the party with formal
authority, whenever informed, picks her preferred project. When she remains
uninformed ex post, that party rubber-stamps the suggestion of the other party
who, whenever informed, has real authority over the project choice and gets his
preferred project implemented. When neither party has information on the payoff
structure, no project is undertaken by the firm.
Let us look then at the equilibrium informational efforts of the two parties
under the two organizations.
2.1. P-organization
We start with the case where the principal has formal power in the firm. The two
parties’ expected payoffs are then
uP = EB + (1−E)eαB − gP (E)− w
uA = Eβb+ (1−E)eb− gA(e)
With probability E, the principal becomes fully informed about her payoffs and
picks her preferred project with monetary payoff B, while the agent receives only
the expected private benefit βb. With probability 1 − E, the principal remains
uninformed about payoffs. The agent may then learn with probability e the pay-
off structure and suggest his best project to the principal (who accepts it). The
principal receives a monetary payoff αB while the agent gets his best private
benefit b. Or the agent may remain also uninformed in which case, no project is
undertaken.
The first order conditions of the two parties with respect to efforts E and e are
Principal: B(1− eα) = gE
Agent:
e = e if k ≤ b(1−E)
= 0 if k > b(1−E)
The conditions highlight the trade off between the principal’s control and the
agent’s initiative. The principal supervises more the higher her stake in the project
(the larger B), the larger the conflict of interest between the principal and the
agent (the lower the congruence α) and the lower the agent’s effort e. The agent,
in turn, has more initiative the higher her stake (the larger b) and the lower the
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principal’s interference (the lower E). Thus, control comes with the cost of loosing
the agent’s initiative.
There are three possible Nash equilibria in effort levels. We select the equi-
librium with the highest agent’s effort which is also the one preferred by the
principal.9
The Nash equilibrium level of efforts under the P-organization is
a) e∗P = e, and E
∗
P =
B(1− eα)
g
when B ≤ eBP (α)
b) e∗P = 0, and E
∗
P =
B
g
when B > eBP (α)
with eBP (α) = g(1− k/b)
1− eαeBP (α) captures the threshold level of profits at which the agent’s initiative is
killed under the P-organization. For monetary payoffs over the threshold leveleBP (α), the principal exerts so much control (i.e. the effort E∗P ) that he kills the
initiatives of the agent to acquire information by himself.
From this discussion, we can finally derive the equilibrium expected utility of the
principal under the P-organization as
u∗P = E
∗
PB + (1− E∗P )e∗PαB − g
(E∗P )
2
2
− w
= g
(E∗P )
2
2
+ e∗PαB − w
2.2. A-organization
Consider now the case where the principal has delegated decision control to the
agent and thus the agent has formal authority. Now the principal is prevented
9For a discussion of the three Nash equilibria see Aghion and Tirole 1997.
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from overruling the agent’s decision when both have acquired information. The
two parties’ expected payoffs are then
vP = eαB + (1− e)EB − gP (E)− w
vA = eb+ (1− e)Eβb− gA(e)
Now the agent chooses his preferred project when informed. When the principal is
informed and the agent is uninformed, the principal suggests her preferred project,
which is then implemented by the agent.
The analysis is similar to the one for the P-organization. We get the following
characterization of the Nash equilibrium effort levels
a) e∗A = e and E
∗
A =
B(1− e)
g
when B ≤ eBA
b) e∗A = 0 and E
∗
A =
B
g
when B > eBA
with eBA = g(1− k/b)
β(1− e)eBA is the critical profit level at which the agent’s initiative is killed under the
A-organization. Above the threshold level eBA the principal’s stakes are so high
that she acquires information E∗A leading to a high probability of intervention
which, in equilibrium, leads to minimum agent’s effort e∗A = 0 .
Note however that
eBA = g(1− k/b)
β(1− e) >
g(1− k/b)
1− eα =
eBP (α)
As eBA > eBP (α), A’s initiative is killed already at a lower profit level under the
P-organization than under the A-organization. The reason is that under the A-
firm the agent has formal authority and therefore has better effort incentives than
when the principal has formal authority. Hence, it requires a larger principal’s
effort to kill the initiative of the agent under the A-firm than under the P-firm.
Consequently, the threshold level of profits of the principal at which the agent’s
effort is shut-off can go up under the A-firm as compared to the P-firm.
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2.3. Optimal Firm Organization
We now summarize and compare the different modes of organization for different
profit levels of the principal. Three cases can be distinguished.
Case 1: B ≤ eBP (α) (low profits)
The utility levels of the principal under the two forms of organization are
simply
u∗P = g
(E∗P )
2
2
+ e∗PαB − w and v∗P = g
(E∗A)
2
2
+ e∗AαB − w
Given that e∗P = e
∗
A = e, and that E
∗
P > E
∗
A in this regime, it follows that u
∗
P > v
∗
P .
Thus, the P-organization dominates the A-organization. At this profit level there
is no trade-off between the principal’s control and the agent’s initiative. When
B is low, the principal monitors and intervenes little under both organizations
because her stakes are small. Therefore, both organizations give sufficient effort
incentives to the agent. However, the principal prefers the P-organization over
the A-organization, since the former gives her more control over the firm.
Case 2: eBP (α) < B ≤ eBA (intermediate profits)
At this profit level, the P-organization kills the agent’s effort e∗P = 0, while
he exerts maximal effort e∗A = e under the A-organization. Thus, the principal’s
expected utilities under the two organizations, respectively are given by
u∗P =
B2
2g
− w and v∗P =
(1− e)2B2
2g
+ eαB − w
u∗P > v
∗
P and thus the principal prefers the P-firm over the A-firm when
B > B¯(α) =
2gα
2− e
B¯(α) is the critical profit level at which the principal is indifferent between the P-
organization and the A-organization. When B is larger than B¯(α), the principal
prefers to exert more control with no agent’s initiative to less control while keeping
the agent’s initiative.
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At intermediate profits the optimal firm organization switches in the follow-
ing way. i) For B¯(α) ≤ eBP (α), the P-organization with agent’s effort domi-
nates the A-organization. ii) For eBP (α) < B¯(α) ≤ eBA, on h eBP (α), B¯(α)i the
A-organization dominates, and on
h
B¯(α), eBAi the P-organization without agent’s
effort is the optimal firm organization. iii) For eBA < B¯(α) the A-organization
dominates the P-organization.
Case 3: eBA < B (high profits)
At this profit level there is again no trade off between control and initiative.
Both firm organizations kill the agent’s initiative and provide the same level of
control to the principal. Hence, they are just equivalent. However, if we allow
for the lowest agent’s effort e to be in the interval [e, e] with e small but strictly
positive, then the P-organization dominates the A-organization. There is more
control under the P-firm. Therefore, we consider the P-firm to dominate the
A-firm in this regime.
We summarize the preceding discussion in proposition 2.1. It states the op-
timal firm organization as a function of the principal’s monetary payoff B when
her preferred project is implemented.
Proposition 2.1. Let Bmin(α) = Min{B¯(α); eBA}
i) If Bmin(α) < eBP (α) the P-organization dominates the A-organization for all
values of B
ii) If eBP (α) < Bmin(α), the firm moves from the P-organization with agent’s
initiative to an A-organization to a P-organization without agent’s initiative
as the profit level increases.
- For B ≤ eBP (α) the P-firm dominates theA-firm with e∗P = e and E∗P =
B(1−αe)
g
- For eBP (α) < B < Bmin(α) the A-firm dominates the P-firm with e∗A =
e and E∗A =
B(1−e)
g
- ForBmin(α) ≤ B the P-firm dominates theA-firm with e∗P = 0 andE∗P = Bg
Intuitively, the mode of organization matters for incentives inside the firm at
intermediate levels of profits only. At low and high profit levels there is no trade-
off between control and initiative. At low profit levels, the principal monitors and
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intervenes little because her stakes are small and she cares little. Therefore, the
P-organization gives sufficient initiative to the agent. The P-firm dominates the
A-firm, because it gives the principal more power over the organization. At high
profit levels, the principal’s stakes are so large that she intervenes even under the
A-organization leading to minimum effort by the agent in both firm organizations.
Since P has more control under the P-firm compared to the A-firm, the principal
prefers the P-firm. At intermediate levels of profits there is a trade-off between
control and initiative. At some intermediate value of B, the A-firm dominates to
give the agent sufficient incentives for initiative. When the profit level B keeps
increasing however, the gain emanating from the agent initiative is overcome by
the loss of control of the principal and the P-firm with no incentives for the agent
becomes the optimal organization.
The comparative static results of Prosposition 2 remain valid when the effort
cost functions of the principal and the agent are reversed with the principal having
linear costs of effort and the agent convex ones. At intermediate levels of profits
the agent’s effort response to changes in profits is low with quadratic costs of
efforts, but it is still crowded out by the principal’s effort because in these range
of profits the principal does so much monitoring when she has linear costs of effort.
More generally, to get a trade-off between control and initiative at intermediate
levels of profits we need two things to hold. First, the principal’s effort has to
be bounded from above E = 1 so that the principal’s increased effort does
not compensate for the decreased effort of the agent. Second, the principal’s
effort response to changes in profits is strong or the agent’s effort response to the
principal’s effort is strong. Thus, in order for the intuition of Proposition 2 to
work either of the two parties may have linear costs of effort and the other convex
costs of effort. When both agents have quadratic costs of effort the trade-off may
disappear. It will depend on the size of the elasticity of effort of one party to the
other. But it will still be the case that when there is a trade-off between control
and initiative it has to be at intermediate profit levels.
¿From our previous analyses we have derived three modes of firm organiza-
tions. First, the formal P-firm in which the agent’s initiative is sustained. In this
organization the firm has an internal hierarchy with two layers of management
(the CEO and the division manager) and the decision power is centralized at the
top of the organization. One can think of this mode of organization as integration
in which the CEO and the division manager are merged in one firm. Second, the
formal A-firm in which the CEO delegates formal control to the division manager.
In this organization the decision power is decentralized. The firm organization is
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less hierarchical and empowers workers at lower layers of the firm hierarchy. One
can think of this mode of organization as outsourcing in which the CEO and the
division manager run two independent firms. Third, the formal P-firm with no
agent’s initiative. In this case the corporation is run by a single manager (the
principal) with no internal hierarchy. We denote the single managed firm with no
internal hierarchy as the DS-organization.10
3. General Equilibrium
In this section we endogenize the principal’s profit B by letting firms compete for
market shares in the product markets and for labor in the labor markets. This
will allow us to analyze the interaction between the organization of the firm and
market competition in general equilibrium. In order to do this, we embed the
model of power inside the firm of the previous section in a general equilibrium
framework with monopolistic competition.
Consider an economy with L workers who can be employed at production as
well as monitoring projects. Labor is taken as the numeraire with a wage rate
w = 1. There are n firms (principals) with n large enough to have monopolistic
competition holding. In order to produce a good, each firm has to undertake a
profitable production project which is a way to run the firm’s production with a
constant marginal cost technology. We embed our previous model of power inside
the firm by assuming that there are ex ante m alternative ways to produce the
good. Thus, before starting to produce the firm needs to get informed about the
cost parameters of the various ways of producing. In order to get the information
and to monitor the project, the firm hires an agent who can undertake an effort
e to get the relevant information. The firm may also learn directly about the
cost structure of the different projects by spending a labor resource cost gE2/2.
As before we assume that out of all the possibilities, only two projects are worth
doing from the point of view of the two parties within the firm. The ”best project”
for the firm (the principal) has marginal costs of production cB in terms of labor.
The ”best project” for the agent has marginal costs of production cb in terms of
labor11. We suppose that cB < cb = ϕcB with ϕ > 1 so that there is no perfect
10We use the Dixit and Stiglitz (DS) model to introduce market competition among firms in
the next section. Thus, the DS-firm will serve as a benchmark for comparison.
11We maintain here all the assumptions made in the partial equilibrium section.
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congruence between the firm and her agent. The idea here is that when the agent
has control in the firm he may choose a project which generates high perks for
him or which advances his career rather than a project which minimizes costs.12
Firms produce a continuum of n different product varieties. On the demand
side workers have preferences over these varieties of the type Dixit-Stiglitz13.
u =
·Z n
0
y(i)γdi
¸
1
γ with 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1
where y(i) is consumption of variety i. The parameter γ measures the degree
of product differentiation, the larger γ the less differentiated are the varieties of
goods.
3.1. Monopolistic competition and product market
Given Dixit-Stiglitz preferences, the demand of each firm i is of the form
y(i) = Ap(i)−
1
1−γ (3.1)
where p(i) is the price of good i and A is given by
A =
R
∫n0 p(i)
− γ
1−γ di
with R as aggregate spending. Aggregate spending equals national income in the
general equilibrium.
12We model the conflict of interest between the principal and her agent as an increase in costs
rather than a proportional reduction in operating profits when the agent picks her preferred
project, since the latter looks more like a hold-up problem rather than a conflict of interest
between the principal and her agent. Modelling the power struggle as coming from projects
which do not necessarily minimize costs appears to us to be more microfounded. Stealing
profits is more of an issue when dealing with the problem of holdup.
13Note that, strictly speaking, to be consistent with the partial equilibrium analysis, the
monitoring agents have to be also infinitely risk averse to avoid pecuniary incentives. This will
be so when their preferences are an infinite concave transformation of the function u. Given
then the agent’s income w = 1, one can still derive the demand for each good in the same way
as for the other workers
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For a product with marginal cost of production c(i), monopolistic profit max-
imization provides the standard mark-up relationship
p(i) =
c(i)
γ
(3.2)
and profit levels can be written as
π(i) = (1− γ)γ
γ
1−γA [c(i)]−
γ
1−γ
Taking the cost differential between the two organizations cb = ϕcB into account
we can rewrite the principal’s profit when her or the agent’s best project is im-
plemented, respectively, as in the partial equilibrium framework of section 2 with
the following expressions for the congruence parameter α and the operating profit
level of the principal B
α = ϕ−
γ
1−γ and B = (1− γ)γ
γ
1−γA [cB]
− γ
1−γ (3.3)
Notice that the trust parameter α is now related to the two parameters ϕ and γ.
The cost differential ϕ = cb/cB measures by how much production costs of the firm
c(i) go up when the agent has control rather than the principal, ϕ > 1. γ captures
the degree of competition in the product market, 0 < γ < 1. The larger is γ the
more similar goods become and the better substitutes they are for each other (i.e.
the larger is the elasticity of substitution between varieties σ = 1/(1− γ)). Thus,
when γ is close to one the market is very competitive. α declines with an increase
in ϕ or γ . The conflict of interest between the principal and the agent becomes
larger when production costs increase when the agent has control rather than the
principal (the larger is ϕ ), and when competition in the product market is more
intense (the larger is γ). When competition becomes more intense, a given cost
differential between the A-firm and the P-firm translates into a larger differential
in market shares and profits and thus delegating power becomes more costly to
the firm.
3.2. Labor market
We turn now to the labor market. Firms hire an agent to supervise the production
project and employ workers to produce the good.
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The firm’s output is given by
y(i) = γ
1
1−γA [c(i)]−
1
1−γ (3.4)
From this, we can derive the total labor demand for each internal organization of
the firm using the law of large numbers and the fact that the probability for a
firm to run a production project with a unit labor cost c(i) is also the fraction of
firms having such a cost structure.
- Labor demand under P-organization with agent’s effort.
Consider first the aggregate labor demand under the P-organization. It can
be written as
LDP = n [E
∗
P cByB + (1−E∗P )e∗P cbyb] + n
"
1 + g
(E∗P )
2
2
#
The first term in the first bracket is the labor demand from firms for which the
principal’s preferred project has been implemented. Their fraction is (by the law
of large numbers) E∗P under the P-organization with a firm’s labor demand cByB.
Similarly, the second term in the first bracket is the labor demand from firms
for which the agent’s preferred project has been implemented. Their fraction
is (1 − E∗P )e∗P under the P-organization with an individual firm’s labor demand
cbyb. In the second bracket of the RHS, the number 1 reflects the hiring of the
monitoring agent for each firm while the term g
(E∗P )
2
2
reflects the labor input of
direct monitoring by the principal. Notice, that the aggregate labor demand of
the economy depends on the economy wide mix of real P-firms and real A-firms
(as compared to formal P-firms and formal A-firms). The reason is that the firm
organization affects the firm’s production costs and with it its output level and
its individual labor demand.14 Substituting yB, yb and cb gives
LDP = nAγ
1
1−γ [E∗P + (1−E∗P )αe∗P ] [cB]
− γ
1−γ + n
"
1 + g
(E∗P )
2
2
#
which can be rewritten as
LDP = n
γB
1− γ [E
∗
P + (1− E∗P )αe∗P ] + n
"
1 + g
(E∗P )
2
2
#
(3.5)
14Note that even under the formal P-organization there will be a share of real A-firms in the
economy, when the principal in these firms decides not to get informed about the project in
which case the agent has real authority (a real A-firm).
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Clearly, this labor demand function holds for regions of the profit levels B for
which the P-organization dominates. Using proposition 2.1 (3.5) holds for
B < B˜P (α) and E
∗
P =
B(1− eα)
g
, e∗P = e (3.6)
Substituting in (3.5), gives finally the following aggregate labor demand
LDP = n
"
B2(1− e∗Pα)2
2g
1 + γ
1− γ +
γ
1− γαe
∗
PB + 1
#
(3.7)
- Labor demand under A-organization with agent’s effort
Consider next the aggregate labor demand under the A-organization. As be-
fore, it can be written as
LDA = n [e
∗
Acbyb + (1− e∗A)E∗AcByB] + n
"
1 + g
(E∗A)
2
2
#
(3.8)
= n
γB
1− γ [e
∗
Aα+ (1− e∗A)E∗A] + n
"
1 + g
(E∗A)
2
2
#
This aggregate labor demand function holds for regions of the profit level B for
which the A-organization dominates. Using again proposition 2.1, this holds when
eBP (α) < B < B¯(α) and E∗A = B(1− e)g , e∗A = e (3.9)
Again substituting (3.9) in (3.8) provides
LDA = n
"
B2(1− e∗A)2
2g
1 + γ
1− γ +
γ
1− γαe
∗
AB + 1
#
(3.10)
- Labor demand under DS-organization with no agent’s effort.
Under the DS-organization only the principal runs the firm and she is the
only agent who engages in information collection. Production can occur only
when information on projects is revealed. The aggregate labor demand under this
benchmark regime can be written as
LD0 = n [E
∗
0cByB] + n
"
1 + g
(E∗0)
2
2
#
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The first term in the first bracket is the labor demand emanating from variable
costs of production from firms which produce effectively. Their fraction is (by
the law of large numbers) E∗0 (the probability for the principal to get the relevant
information on the projects’ payoffs) with a firm’s labor demand cByB. The
second bracket of the RHS, describes the labor demand emanating from the fixed
costs of production. The number 1 reflects the hiring of the monitoring agent
for each firm.15 The term g
(E∗0 )
2
2
reflects the labor cost of direct monitoring by
the principal, given that he is the only one to actively search for information.
Substitution again gives :
LD0 = nAγ
1
1−γE∗0 [cB]
− γ
1−γ + n
"
1 + g
(E∗0)
2
2
#
which can be rewritten as:
LD0 = n
γB
1− γE
∗
0 + n
"
1 + g
(E∗0)
2
2
#
(3.11)
Clearly, this labor demand function holds for regions of profits B for which the
DS-organization dominates. Using proposition 2.1 (3.11) holds for
B > B¯(α) and E∗0 =
B
g
, (3.12)
Substitution in (3.11), yields finally the following aggregate labor demand
LD0 = n
"
B2
2g
1 + γ
1− γ + 1
#
(3.13)
The labor market clearing condition can then be generally stated as
LDi = L for i ∈ {P,A, 0} (3.14)
It is useful to compare here the three labor demand functions LDP , L
D
0 , L
D
A under
the three organizations. Notice from (3.7), (3.10), and (3.13) that for a given value
of B labour demand can be ranked as LD0 > L
D
P > L
D
A . The reason is that under
the DS-firm the principal’s labor input for information acquisition is largest, since
15Though the agent is useless for the principal under the DS-organization, he nevertheless has
to be paid his reservation utility level because of contract incompleteness ex ante.
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there is no agent around as captured by the term g
(E∗0 )
2
2
and lowest under the
A-organization , with the P-firm with agent’s effort in between. The extra effort
by the principal under the P-firm (with and without agent’s initiative) leads to
lower marginal costs of production, larger output and thus larger labor demand
compared to the A-firm. The A-firm is most efficient from an informational point
of view and least efficient from a production cost point of view. The reverse is
the case for the DS-firm. Information acquisition effort by the agent cannot be
contracted upon ex ante when the agent is hired. Therefore, the DS-firm without
agent’s effort is the least efficient organization from an informational point of
view. The reason is that in the P-firm with agent’s effort and in the A-firm two
people are acquiring information about projects and thus there is a higher chance
that a good project is discovered than when the principal does it all by herself.
3.3. Organizational Equilibrium with Free Entry
We turn now to characterize the equilibrium industrial structure and the associ-
ated organization within firms. The timing of events is the following. In a first
stage, firms decide whether or not to enter the market and to hire an agent to
monitor projects. At this stage, there is free entry. In a second stage, firms decide
who has formal power in the organization by choosing between the formal P-firm
and the formal A-firm. In a third stage, information collection efforts are realized
by the two parties and a project is selected. This, in turn, determines who has
real power in the organization. Finally there is production, consumption and labor
market clearing.
To describe the industrial structure of the economy we use the free entry con-
dition for the monopolistic sector. This condition can be written as Max{UP (B),
UA(B), U0(B)} = w = 1 where UP (B), UA(B), and U0(B) are the profit levels of
the firm gross of the wage of the agent, respectively under each internal organi-
zation P , A or DS16 The “Max” argument in the free entry condition reflects the
fact that each firm decides about its optimal type after market entry.
16With the previous notation these profit levels are
UP (B) = uP + w = g
(E∗P )
2
2 + e
∗
PαB =
B2(1−αe)2
2g + eαB
UA(B) = uA + w = g
(E∗A)
2
2 + e
∗
AαB =
B2(1−e)2
2g + eαB
U0(B) = u0 + w = g
(E∗0 )
2
2 =
B2
2g
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Three types of free entry equilibria are possible.
i) Equilibrium with P-organization and e∗P = e
The free entry condition in such a regime is
UP (B) = g
(E∗P )
2
2
+ eαB = 1 (3.15)
The endogenous values (B, n,E∗P , e
∗
P )determining an equilibrium in this regime
are then given (3.7) and (3.15). After substituting, the free entry condition and
the labor market clearing condition can be restated as
B2(1− αe)2
2g
+ eαB = 1 and L =
n
1− γ
"
B2(1− αe)2
2g
+ 1
#
(3.16)
The free entry condition gives a unique positive solution BP = B
∗
P (α) which is the
profit level required to make a firm indifferent between entering and not entering
the market as a P-firm. Substituting into the labor market clearing condition
provides then the equilibrium number of firms n∗P as
n∗P =
(1− γ)Lh
(B∗P )
2(1−αe)2
2g
+ 1
i (3.17)
Obviously, an equilibrium in this regime exists if and only if B∗P (α) ≤ eBP (α).
As is well known from the Dixit and Stiglitz model, the number of varieties n∗P
depend on the size of the country L and on the degree of market power γ as given
in the numerator.17 With an increase in γ firms’ market power declines (product
varieties become more similar and are better substitutes for each other) and thus
firms charge lower mark-ups over marginal costs. Output per firm increases and
thus, a smaller number of firms can be sustained in equilibrium. Furthermore,
the number of firms decline with the fixed costs of market entry (with the costs of
information collection by the principal and the agent) as given by the denominator
of the expression. The fixed costs of market entry increase with an increase in the
conflict of interest inside the firm (with a decline in α) since firms will require a
larger level of profits to enter the market.
17An increase in country size leads to an increase in the number of firms without changing
output per firm. This is a well known property of the DS-model.
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The free entry conditions (3.15), (3.18) and (3.21) and the labor market clear-
ing condition (3.14) make sure that there are an equal number of principals and
agents. The free entry conditions determine the number of firms and the number
of principals. Principals then hire from the pool of labor supply workers for pro-
duction and workers for control (agents). The wage rate adjusts so that there are
an equal number of principals and agents and all the remaining workers are hired
as production workers. The alternative occupation for an agent is to become a
production worker. We assume here a somewhat myopic behavior of agents. Ex
ante workers are indifferent whether they become control workers or production
workers. Ex post when hired as control workers, agents learn about the non mon-
etary benefit they have from being control workers. Ex post they prefer to control
rather than to produce.
ii) Equilibrium with A-organization and e∗A = e
The free entry condition in such a regime is
UA(B) = g
(E∗A)
2
2
+ eαB = 1 (3.18)
The endogenous values (B,n,E∗A, e
∗
A) determining an equilibrium in this regime
are then given by (3.9), (3.10), and (3.18). After substitution, the free entry
condition and the labor market clearing condition can be expressed as
B2(1− e)2
2g
+ eαB = 1 and L =
n
1− γ
"
B2(1− e)2
2g
+ 1
#
(3.19)
The free entry condition gives a unique positive solution for B∗A(α) which is then
substituted into the labor market clearing condition. This then provides the
equilibrium number of firms n∗A as
n∗A =
(1− γ)Lh
(B∗A)
2(1−e)2
2g
+ 1
i (3.20)
An equilibrium in this regime exists if and only if eBP (α) ≤ B∗A(α) < B¯(α).
iii) Equilibrium with DS-organization and e∗P = 0
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Finally the free entry condition in such a regime is
U0(B) = g
(E∗0)
2
2
= 1 (3.21)
After a similar calculation as in the cases before we obtain the equilibrium number
of firms as
n∗0 =
1− γ
2
L (3.22)
Such an equilibrium exists when B∗P =
√
2g > B¯(α).
Notice that the n∗0 equilibrium corresponds to the standard Dixit and Stiglitz
equilibrium number of varieties with fixed costs of production equal to 2, which
consists of the labor input of 1 agent plus the principal’s labor input for informa-
tion acquisition g(E∗P )
2/2 = (B∗P )
2/2g = 1.
Notice further, that from the conditions (3.16) and (3.19) we can rank the
required equilibrium profit levels for a DS-firm B∗0 , an A-firm B
∗
A, and, for a P-
firm with agent’s effort B∗P , respectively as B
∗
0 > B
∗
A > B
∗
P . The DS-firm requires
the largest profit to enter the market, since information collection effort falls on
the principal herself. Also, B∗A > B
∗
P , since some of the principal’s profit gets lost
under the A-organization (as measured by α). Hence, the principal will have an
incentive to enter the market only when sufficient high profits make sure that she
is compensated for this loss in profits under the A-organization.
Figure 1: The Firms’ Profit Curves
The equilibrium industrial structure under free entry in each regime as given
by (3.17), (3.20), and (3.22) are illustrated graphically in Figure 1. From the
figure it becomes apparent that the equilibria are stable and we can rule out
mixed equilibria with some firms choosing an A-organization and others choosing
a P-organization. The figure gives the different profit curves of the principal gross
of the wage rate w of the agent UP (B), UA(B), and U0(B) under the three firm
organizations P, A and 0 in terms of the principal’s payoff B (see footnote 14).
UP (B) is above UA(B) and U0(B), while UA(B) cuts U0(B) from above at point
B¯A. Above the threshold level of profits eBP the agent’s initiative is killed under
the P-organization. Thus, above eBP the P-firm with initiative stops to exist. As
a result UP (B) above the profit level eBP is irrelevant and therefore drawn as a
dotted line. The firm chooses the organization whichMax [UP (B), UA(B), U0(B)]
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which is given by the bold line in the figure. The figure illustrates the results of
proposition 2.1. For B < eBP , the principal chooses the P-firm with initiative as
her optimal organization. For eBP < B < B¯A, the optimal choice of organization
is an A-firm, and for B¯A < B, the principal chooses the DS-firm as her optimal
organization. The free entry condition is given by Max [UP (B), UA(B), U0(B)] =
w = 1. The free entry equilibria are obtained by the intersection of the horizontal
line w = 1 with the gross profit curves UP (B), UA(B), U0(B). Three equilibria are
possible depending on where the wage line crosses the gross profit curves. As it is
drawn we have a P-equilibrium in point A, an A-equilibrium in point D, and a DS-
equilibrium in point E. The figure demonstrates that the A-equilibrium is stable.
For example, the A-equilibrium cannot be disturbed by a P-firm (with lower costs),
since in the range of profits in which the A-firm emerges as an equilibrium, the
P-firm with agent’s initiative stops to be a a feasible organization. In the range of
profits eBP < B < B¯A the principal can choose only between the A-organization
and the DS-organization. Given that the A-organization yields higher profits, she
chooses the former.18
4. Market Competition and Firm Organization
In this section we analyze how market competition affects the firm organization.
In terms of the model, we look at whether changes in α and/or γ make it more
likely that a formal P-organization (with or without agent effort) or a formal
A-organization will emerge in equilibrium.
It is useful to start the analysis of the interaction between the firm organization
and market competition from a partial equilibrium perspective.
Figure 2: Optimal Firm Organization and Market Competition
The optimal firm organization is illustrated in Figure 219. The B˜P (α)-curve
relates the profit level to the incentives inside the firm and thus to the costs
of producing. Recall that the B˜P (α)-curve represents the profit level at which
18From this argument it follows that the discussed stability of equilibria do not depend on the
sequence of events. If we reverse the timing and let firms choose their firm types before market
entry the same symmetric equilibria emerge.
19To simplify the exposition, Figure 2 only shows the case where B(α) < eBA for all α ∈ [0, 1]
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the effort incentive of the agent is killed under the P-organization. Thus, B˜P (α)
captures under the P-firm the costs of having a centralized mode of organization
in terms of the loss of the agents initiative. B˜P (α) is upward sloping in α (is
downward sloping in γ) because with an increase in α the conflict of interest
between the principal and the agent declines (the preferences between the principal
and the agent become more similar). At a given profit level B, the principal
intervenes less when the agent’s preferred project is more congruent with her
objectives, allowing the profit level at which the agent’s initiative is killed to go
up. In the area below the B˜P (α)-line the P-firm keeps the agent’s initiative alive,
while in the area above B˜P (α) the agent does not exert any effort under the
P-organization.
In Figure 2, the B¯(α)-line relates the profit level to the market environment
of the firm and thus to the benefit of having a cost efficient mode of organization.
Recall that the B¯(α)-line represents the profit level at which the principal is indif-
ferent between the DS-firm with e = 0 and the A-firm with the agents maximum
initiative e (this is the relevant comparison because the principal always prefers
the P-firm with e compared to the A-firm with e). Thus, B¯(α) captures the bene-
fit of having a centralized mode of organization in terms of the firm’s profit. B¯(α)
is downward sloping in γ (is upward sloping in α) because with an increase in
γ the market power of the firm declines. Thus, delegating power to the agent
becomes more costly to the principal since a more costly mode of organization
translates into a larger loss in profits. With a loss of power in the market, the
firm wants more power inside the firm. Therefore, the threshold level of profits
at which the principal is indifferent between the P-firm and the A-firm goes down
with an increase in γ. In the area below the B¯(α)- line the gain is larger when the
agent’s initiative is sustained even when the principal looses control. Thus, the
principal prefers to delegate power to the agent. In the area above the B¯(α)-line
the reverse is the case and thus the principal prefers to keep control.
We are now ready to analyze which organization will emerge in response to
changes in the market environment. In the area P1 below the B˜P (α)-curve the
gain of control outweighs the costs and thus the principal chooses the P-firm as
and Bmin(α) = B(α). As is shown in the appendix, this is ensured when :
2e
2− e <
(1− k/b)
β(1− e)
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her organization. At B < B˜P (α) there are, in fact, no costs of control as the
agent’s initiative can be kept alive under the P-organization. In the area A, in
between the two curves B˜P (α) and B¯(α), the costs of control outweigh the gain
and thus the principal chooses the A-firm. In this area delegating control allows
to maintain the agents initiative while at the same time delegating does not cost
too much in terms of loss in profits, since B < B¯(α). As can be seen, the area A in
which the A-organization is optimal increases in size with a decline in γ, since the
smaller γ, the smaller the loss in profits which results from delegating power inside
the firm. Finally, in the areas P0 and P2, the firm chooses the DS-organization
since in the region B˜P (α) < B¯(α) < B and at γ close to one the principal’s stakes
are so high that the costs of having control become smaller relative to its gain.
Market competition is so tough and/or profits are so high that the principal kills
the initiative of the agent also under the A-firm, while delegating power incurs
large losses in market shares.
Figure 3: Equilibrium Entry
We now turn to determine the profit level in the market. Profits are determined
by market entry as given by the free entry conditions (3.15), (3.18), and (3.21).
Firms enter the market until profits are driven down to zero. We now ask how
the firm’s incentive to enter the market is affected by market competition. In
terms of the model, we look at how the equilibrium condition for free entry for
the P-firm and the A-firm, respectively is affected by changes in γ or α. This
is shown in Figure 3. Recall that the curves B∗P (α) and B
∗
A(α) are the required
profit levels to enter the market as a P-firm and as an A-firm, respectively. Both
curves slope down with α (slope up with γ) since both firms revenues increase
with α (i.e. decrease with γ) and thus firms require a lower profit to enter the
market. The monotone and increasing relationship between B∗ and γ means
that market competition increases the stakes of the firm and thus influences how
competition affects the behavior inside the firm.20 The B∗A(α)-curve lies above the
B∗P (α)-curve, since for any given α the A-firm will have a harder time to survive
competition in the product market as its price will be larger than the price of the
P-firm. Therefore, the A-firm requires a higher profit to enter the market. When
the firm does not face competition or preferences between the principal and the
agent are perfectly congruent (when α = 1 or γ = 0) the mode of organization
20In figure 3 the AT model meets the DS model in the sense that an increase in market
competition (an increase in γ) can be treated in the same way as an increase in the stakes of
the principal (an increase in B).
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stops to matter since all costs can be passed on to consumers without a loss in
the market share (at α = 1 the two curves collapse to the same required profit
value B∗A(α) = B
∗
P (α)).
Figure 4: Equilibrium Organization with Free Entry
Figure 4 combines the insights of Figure 2 and Figure 3 to analyze the equi-
librium mode of organization under free entry21. Thus, the figure looks at how
endogenous profits (given by the free entry conditions) interact with the firm’s
optimal choice of organization. The two curves B˜P (α) and B¯(α) from Figure 2
characterizing the optimal choice of internal organization are plotted as well as
the two curves B∗P (α) and B
∗
A(α) from Figure 3 describing the free entry profit
levels under the P-firm with agent’s effort (i.e. e = e) and under the A-firm. In
addition, the horizontal line B∗0 =
√
2g is giving the free entry profit level under
the DS-firm.
A free entry equilibrium P-organization with agent’s effort is along the curve
B∗P (α) in the region of α in [αP , 1]. Below the B˜P (α)-curve firms want to choose
the P-organization (we know this from Figure 2) and along the B∗P (α)-curve firms
have an incentive to enter the market anticipating their choice of a P-organization.
Thus, along the curve B∗P (α) in the region of α in [αP , 1] firms enter and choose
the P-organization. Similarly, a free entry equilibrium A-organization with high
agent’s effort is along the curve B∗A(α) and in between the two curves B˜P (α) and
B¯(α). We know from Figure 2 that in between the curves B˜P (α) and B¯(α) firms
choose the A-organization. Along the B∗A(α) curve firms will have an incentive
to enter the market anticipating their choice of an A-organization. Thus, firms
enter and choose the A-organization along the B∗A(α) curve in the region of α in
[α,αA]. Finally, a free entry equilibrium DS-organization is along the flat curve
B∗0 =
√
2g above the curve B¯(α). We know from Figure 2 that above the curve
B¯(α) firms prefer the DS-organization to the A-organization with agent’s effort.
Along the B∗0-curve profits are such that firms want to enter as DS-firms.
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21The precise derivation of figure 4 is given in the appendix.
22The figure can be used also to demonstrate that mixed equilibria can be ruled out almost
surely. In order to have a mixed equilibrium firms must be indifferent between the A-organization
and the DS-organization (recall that the P-organization with effort always dominates the A-
organization with effort). This requires B to be on the B(α)-line. But it also requires B to be
29
The bold line in Figure 4 describes the nature of the free entry organizational
equilibria as a function of the degree of competition γ (or the degree of trust
α). Several points are worth noticing. First, at α = 1 and γ = 0 the two
organizations are equivalent from the point of view of the firm. At this parameter
values, preferences of the principal and the agent are perfectly congruent. Either
ϕ = 1 and there is no cost differential between the two modes of organization. Or
ϕ > 1, but the cost differential does not matter for profits. Market competition
is so weak at γ = 0 that any organizational inefficiency can be passed on to
consumers without loosing market share.
Second, with an increase in γ (a decrease in α) the equilibrium firm organiza-
tion moves from centralization of power to decentralization of power and finally to
a single managed firm (from a P-firm with agent effort to an A-firm to a DS-firm).
Typically, with an increase in competition the firm requires a larger level of profit
B∗ to enter the market under both organizations. This means that the stakes
of the firm rise with more competition and thus the firm has a larger incentive
to monitor projects. Initially, with little competition for values of α in the range
of [αP , 1], the firm’s free entry stakes B
∗ are not too high. Therefore, the firm’s
monitoring does not kill the initiatives of the agent even under the P-organization.
Hence, firms choose the latter. However, when competition keeps increasing and
γ takes intermediate values, then the required stakes to enter the market are high
enough to kill the initiative of the agent under the P-firm but not under the A-
firm. This in turn means that there is a trade-off between control and initiative
for the firm. As long as the free entry stakes are not too high (i.e. corresponding
to values of α in [α,αA]), the A-organization will emerge as an equilibrium free
entry outcome for each firm. Finally, as competition is increasing further ( i.e.
corresponding to values of α smaller than α), the required profit level for mar-
ket entry increases further until the stakes for the firm become so high that the
trade-off between control and initiative balances out in favor of control and the
DS-firm emerges as the equilibrium organization.
Third, the model produces multiple equilibria for α in the range of [αP ,αA].
At intermediate levels of competition one equilibrium mode of organization is the
P-firm with high agent’s effort and another equilibrium mode of organization is
on the B∗A(α)-curve in order for the firm to have an incentive to enter as an A-firm. This kind
of situation can occur only in the figure when the two curves intersect at α. Hence, if at all a
mixed equilibrium between the A-organization and the DS-organisation can occur only for one
value of α = α.
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the A-firm23. The reason for such multiple equilibria comes from a ”strategic com-
plementarity ” among firms at the decision stage of optimal firm organization. At
an intermediate level of competition the attractiveness between these two modes
of organizations depends on the organizational decisions taken by other firms in
the market. Each firm individually would choose the A-organization at this level
of competition, since in between the curves B˜P (α) and B¯(α) the A-organization is
optimal. However, when the firm anticipates at this stage that all the other firms
will choose the P-organization, then, she also anticipates that the profit and cost
level in the market will be low as well. Recall that P-firms have lower costs and
thus require a lower profit level for market entry. Thus, the firm anticipates that
it will be hard for her to survive competition with an A-organization. Therefore,
market entry as an A-firm is not profitable and the firm’s best choice after entry
will be to choose a P-organization as well. Similarly, when the firm anticipates
that all the other firms will choose the A-organization, then she expects to be
a viable competitor in the market with an A-organization. Thus, the firm also
opts for an A-organization after market entry. The multiplicity of organizational
equilibria arise due to a coordination problem among firms which comes from the
fact that the firm’s choice of organization depends on her profits as well as on
the profits of the other firms in the market. The other firms profit level, in turn,
depends on what firm organization they have chosen. As aggregate costs in the
market are determined by the composition of A-firms and P-firms in the mar-
ket, the model produces a feedback mechanism by which the firm’s organizational
choice determines market conditions, which, in turn, influence an individual firm’s
choice of firm organization.
Note that the coordination problem among firms disappears for low and high
levels of competition, outside the range of α of [αP ,αA]. When competition is low
(in the range of α of [αA, 1] the firm’s organizational choice does not depend on
other firms’ organizational decision, because individual and aggregate costs do not
matter too much for how well the firm is doing in the market. When competition
is tough (in the range of α of [α,αP ]) the option for the firm to choose a P-
organization with high agent’s effort disappears altogether and thus, as our firm,
all the other firms in the market will choose the A-organization as well and they
23There is also a third equilibrium which corresponds to the case where the P-firm has a
third Nash ”interior” equilibrium in terms of the agent’s effort and the principal’s effort e∗P =
1
α(1 −
g(1− kb )
B ), E
∗
P = 1 − kb . This Nash equilibrium has been selected away because it was
dominated by the agent’s high effort equilibrium e∗P = e, E
∗
P = (1− αe)B/g
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will not find it profitable to enter as P-firms. Thus, in either case, at low and high
levels of competition, there is no need to coordinate actions among firms.
5. Conclusion
In this paper we examine how market competition interacts with the firms’ mode
of organization in general equilibrium. Market competition changes the behavior
of the people inside the firm. With an increase in market competition the conflict
of interests between different layers of management becomes more costly to the
firm as the power struggle translates in a larger loss in market share. As the stakes
rise, the CEO gets more involved in the decisions taken and monitors more inside
the firm when her market power is eroded by competition. The increase in the
CEO’s control in the firm comes, however, with the potential costs of loosing the
initiative and enthusiasm of lower level management. Under these circumstances,
it may be worthwile for the CEO to change the mode of organization and to
delegate decision power to lower levels of management to preserve its initiative.
The empowerment of management involves then a shift to a firm organization
with larger production costs. Thus, to empower workers at lower levels of the
firm hierarchy a profit maximizing corporation might not opt for the ’leanest’
organization which minimizes costs.
Our model produces multiple equilibria which arise out of a strategic com-
plementarity among firms organizational decisions. Firms organizational choice
determines market conditions, which in turn, influence an individual firm’s choice
of firm organization. This feedback mechanism can account for why two otherwise
identical countries might have different corporate cultures (like i. e. centralized
corporate organization in Germany and decentralized corporate organization in
the US). Firms in one country choose a particular corporate organization because
they expect other firms to choose this organization.24 Globalization leads to a con-
vergence in corporate cultures across countries. This may result in merger waves
(a shift from an A-organization to a P-organization) or in waves of outsourcing (a
move from a P-organization to an A-organization) when countries become more
24For the role of history versus expectations, see Krugman (1991).
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integrated into the world economy as the corporate sector reorganizes in response
to an increase in international competition. 25
25In Mc Laren (2001) international trade can lead to an increase in arm’s length trade which
tends to be ’internationally contagious’. In his model international trade lowers the hold-up
problem that input suppliers face, which in turn, leads to an increase in arm’s length trade. In
Legros and Newman (2000) a change in the liquidity positions of firms can induce economy wide
organizational changes.
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Figure 1: The Firm´s Profit Curve
Figure 2: Firm Organization and Market Competition
Figure 3: Equilibrium Entry
Figure 4: Free Entry Equilibrium Organization
6. Appendix I
Description of the various equilibria in terms of the congruence pa-
rameter α.
• Derivation of Figure 2
Recall the functions:
eBP (α) = g(1− k/b)
1− eα ,
eBA = g(1− k/b)
β(1− e) , B¯(α) =
2gα
2− e
Bmin(α) =Min{B¯(α); eBA}
It can be seen that eBP (α) is increasing convex with
eBP (0) = g(1− k/b) > 0 and eBP (1) = g(1− k/b)
1− e
We assume for simplicity of exposition:
Condition A.1:
2(1− e)
2− e βe < (1− k/b) <
2(1− e)
2− e
From the first inequality of condition A.1:
2e
2− e <
(1− k/b)
β(1− e) (6.1)
Hence B¯(α) < B¯(1) < eBA and Bmin(α) =Min{B¯(α); eBA} = B¯(α)
¿From the second inequality of condition A.1:
eBP (1) = (1− k/b)g
1− e <
2g
2− e = B¯(1)
Hence the two curves B¯(α) and eBP (α) look like in figure 2 and do intersect with
each other at some point eα.
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• Derivation of Figure 3
Now consider the ”equilibrium” levels of profits B∗P (α) under a P-organization
(with high effort e) and B∗A(α) under the A-organization. They are, respectively
given by :
B2P (1− eα)2
2g
+ eαBP − 1 = 0 (6.2)
and
B2A(1− e)2
2g
+ eαBA − 1 = 0 (6.3)
Differentiation gives immediately:
∂B∗P (α)
∂α
=
−eBP
h
1− BP (1−eα)
g
i
BP (1−eα)2
g
+ eα
< 0
∂B∗A(α)
∂α
=
−eBA
BA(1−e)2
g
+ eα
< 0
The two functions are decreasing in α. Moreover, from (6.2) and (6.3)
B∗P (α) < B
∗
A(α) for all α ∈ [0, 1[, and B∗P (1) = B∗A(1) = B∗
with B∗ such that
(B∗)2(1− e)2
2g
+ eB∗ = 1
Also B∗P (0) =
√
2g which is the equilibrium firm’s profits under a P-organization
with no agent’s effort (e = 0). The two functions B∗P (α) < B
∗
A(α) are then as
represented in figure 3.
The largest possible equilibrium profit value is B∗A(0) = (
√
2g)/ (1− e). Thus
to ensure that the principal’s effort levels E, are always less than 1 (to be proba-
bilities), we need
B(1− αe) < g for all possible values of B and α ∈ [0, 1]
A sufficient condition for this to hold is
B∗A(0) < g
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or the following condition
Condition A.2:
2
(1− e)2 < g
which we assume to be satisfied ( the cost function g(E) is convex enough)
• Derivation of Figure 4
A number of useful results are described now:
Lemma 6.1. Given condition A:2, we have
B∗P (1) = B
∗
A(1) = B
∗ < B¯(1) =
2g
2− e
Proof. Indeed B∗ < B¯(1) if and only if
(B∗)2(1− e)2
2g
+ eB∗ = 1 <
(B¯(1))2(1− e)2
2g
+ eB¯(1)
the last inequality is equivalent to
1 < 2g
"
(1− e)2
(2− e)2 +
e
2− e
#
which is satisfied when
1 < 2g
(1− e)2
(2− e)2
which is implied by condition A.2.
Lemma 6.2. There exists a unique value α = α between 0 and 1 such that
B∗A(α) = B¯(α) = B
∗
P (0) =
q
2g
In other words, α is at the common intersection of the curves B∗A(α), B¯(α) and
the horizontal line B = B∗P (0) =
√
2g
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Proof. Consider the value α ∈]0, 1[ such that :
B∗P (0) =
q
2g = B∗A(α) (6.4)
Such a value exists, as B∗A(α) is strictly decreasing in α and B
∗
A(0) > B
∗
P (0) >
B∗P (1) = B
∗
A(1) = B
∗. From (6.4), it follows that
(B∗A(α))
2
2g
= 1
and by definition of B∗A(α),
(B∗A(α))
2(1− e)2
2g
+ eα(B∗A(α)) = 1
at the same time B¯(α) is defined by the value of profits such that
B¯(α)2(1− e)2
2g
+ eαB¯(α)− 1 = B¯(α)
2
2g
− 1
(indifference between an A-organization and a DS-organization with e = 0).
Clearly
(B∗A(α))
2(1− e)2
2g
+ eα(B∗A(α))− 1 =
(B∗A(α))
2
2g
− 1 = 0
Hence B∗A(α) = B¯(α) and α is at the common intersection of the curves B
∗
A(α),
B¯(α) and the horizontal line B = B∗P (0) =
√
2g.
Configuration of parameters ensuring the existence of an A-equilibrium.
Clearly there will be an A-organizational equilibrium if and only if there exists
α such that eBP (α) < B∗A(α) < B¯(α)
Given thatB∗A(α) is decreasing in α and that B¯(α) is increasing in α, this condition
is equivalent to the existence of some α > α such that eBP (α) < B∗A(α). It is easy to
see that, because of the continuity of the various functions in α, this is equivalent
to eBP (α) < B∗A(α). Now α is determined byq
2g = B¯(α) =
2gα
2− e
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Hence
α =
2− e√
2g
After substitution, the condition eBP (α) < B∗A(α) writes as:
Condition A.3 g
Ã
1− k
b
!
<
q
2g − e(2− e)
which we assume to be satisfied. ( If this is not the case, the A-organization
cannot be an equilibrium outcome with free entry).
The whole picture of the structure of the organizational equilibria in terms of
α is then described by the following proposition
Proposition 6.3. There exist αP and αA in [0, 1] with 0 < α < αA and αP ≤
αA ≤ 1 such that
i) the DS-organization with e = 0 is an equilibrium for α ∈ [0,Min(α,αP )[.
ii) the P-organization with e = e is an equilibrium for α ∈ [αP , 1[
iii) the A-organization is an equilibrium for α ∈ [α,αA]
iv) at α = 1, the firm organization is irrelevant.
Proof. 1) Assume first that B∗ < eBP (1). B∗P (α) and B∗A(α) are decreasing
continuous functions of α and that eBP (α) is increasing continuous in α. Also with
condition A.3, B∗A(0) > B
∗
P (0) =
√
2g > g
³
1− k
b
´
= eBP (0) and B∗A(1) = B∗P (1) =
B∗ < eBP (1). Hence there exists by continuity αP and αA in [0, 1] such that
B∗P (αP ) =
eBP (αP ) and B∗A(αA) = eBP (αA). Because of condition A.3, B∗A(α) >eBP (α). Therefore B∗A(α)− eBP (α) > 0 = B∗A(αA)− eBP (αA). As B∗A(α)− eBP (α)
is decreasing in α, it follows clearly that α < αA. Also, as B
∗
A(α) > B
∗
P (α)
for all α ∈ [0, 1[, B∗A(α) − eBP (α) > B∗P (α) − eBP (α) for all α ∈ [0, 1[ . Hence
B∗A(αA) − eBP (αA) = 0 = B∗P (αP ) − eBP (αP ) < B∗A(αP ) − eBP (αP2). As again
B∗A(α)− eBP (α) is decreasing in α, we get αP < αA.
2) Assume that B∗ > eBP (1). Then, for all α in 0, 1[B∗A(α) > B∗P (α) > B∗P (1) =
B∗ > eBP (1) > eBP (α). In that case we pose αP = αA = 1.
With these definitions of αP and αA, it is then easy to verify the conditions
which provide i),ii) ,iii) and iv).
i) The domain of validity for a DS-organization with e = 0 to be an equilibrium
is
√
2g > Bmin(α) and the fact the P-organization with e = e is not possible with
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free entry. Given condition A.1, the first aspect can be restated as
√
2g > B¯(α)
which is equivalent to α < α. When α < αP then this condition is also sufficient.
When αP < α however, this is not sufficient because in such a case, there exists
a α ∈]αP ,α[ such that B∗P (α) < eBP (α). For such an α, a P-organization with
e = e is possible with free entry.This organization will always dominate a DS-
organization with e = 0. Hence the condition for a DS-organization with e = 0
to be an equilibrium becomes in such a case α < αP . Summarizing the two
previous cases, we can say that a DS-organization with e = 0 is an equilibrium
for α ∈ [0,Min(α,αP )[.
ii) The domain of validity for a P-organization with e = e to be an equilibrium
simplyB∗P (α) <
eBP (α). Given the definition of αP , this is equivalent to α ∈ [αP , 1[
iii) Similarly the domain of validity for an A-organization to be an equilibrium
is eBP (α) < B∗A(α) < Bmin(α) = B¯(α) which is equivalent to α ∈ [α,αA] by the
definition of α and αA.
iv) is trivial as for α = 1, the two organizations are equivalent
The characterization is represented in figure 4 for the case α < αP . Notice that
for α ∈ [αP ,αA[ there are multiple organizational equilibria: the P-organization
with high effort and the A-organization.
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